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1THEORIES OF TERMINATION IN CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT:
THE SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS
Introduction
The common law rules governing the termination of a contract of employment are
unsatisfactory and obscure.  Hitherto, the courts have purported to develop rules
according to alternative well-known rival theories.  The first of these is a modified
version of the so-called “elective theory” derived from the ordinary law of contract.
This, of course, determines that a contract should only end upon the election of the
innocent party. The alternative approach favoured the so-called “automatic” theory,
which is applicable only in the employment context.   According to this latter theory, a
repudiatory breach of an employment contract ipso facto ends it. There is no need for
any acknowledgment of this by the innocent party who is also denied the opportunity
to keep the contract alive.
The problem of reconciling these theories has been described by some authors  as
intractable.1 Another has observed that the problem requires “urgent attention”. 2
However, in their seminal textbook, Industrial Law,3 Smith & Wood assert that the
debate as to which of these theories is dominant is, in practice largely irrelevant. This
                                                          
1 P Davies &  M Freedland,”Labour Law” 2nd edition London, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1984 at p.
457.
2  K D Ewing, “Remedies for the Breach of the Contract of Employment”, (1993) 52 Cambridge L.J.
405 at p. 414.
3 7th edition (2000) Butterworths, London  at 379-80.  The authors do, however, concede  that in cases
where some collateral or incidental matter relies upon “the technical continued existence of the
contract” practical consequences can follow.  A similar perspective is offered by Bowers and
Honeyball, “Textbook on Labour Law”, 6th edition , London: Blackstone, 2000 at pp 65-69.
2is so partly because the refined version of the elective theory delivers similar practical
results to the automatic one.
This article will venture three principal contentions: first it will argue that there
remain important practical differences between the two rival theories, and the courts
should not regard the choice between them as merely academic. Second, and more
fundamentally, it will be argued that each theory is an incomplete and unsatisfactory
explanation of the rules the courts actually apply. Each is flawed by a common
misunderstanding of the authorities   governing the consideration for wages. Finally, it
will be argued that, as neither theory is satisfactory, a more sophisticated and coherent
approach should be constructed in their place.
Why the Elective/Automatic Distinction Matters
A contrary argument to that ventured by Smith & Wood asserts that there remain
important practical differences between the opposing theories.  Entitlements that can
be identified according to one theory can be denied under the alternative theory.  In
Turner v Australasian Coal and Shale Employees Federation, for example, the Full
Court of the Federal Court of Australia recognised how great an impact the choice the
between the rival theories could be. It resolved that the elective rather than the
automatic theory properly explained the Australian common law, and ventured the
following observation about the enforcement of certain rights that was crucially
dependent on that conclusion:
3“ From the employer’s point of view, there may be a desire to restrain the
employee from accepting employment which would be in breach of a restraint of
trade clause, or from acting contrary to some term of the contract which
restricts the employee in his or her activities after the end of the employment.
From the employee’s point of view, there may be entitlements to annual leave or
long service leave or superannuation which depend upon the continuance of the
employment.”4
But these must be considered merely as examples, because it is possible to identify
other claims that crucially depend upon which approach is chosen.  For example, there
is both English and Australian authority to establish that an eligibility to claim
statutory rights can depend on the contract being in existence at the commencement of
a new legal regime.5   Moreover, in English law, a complaint alleging sexual
harassment after the employment has ended cannot be presented, so the differences
between the automatic and elective theories will have different consequences as to
when the complaint can be made.6  Similarly, the Race Relations Act 1976 has been
held not to protect a former employee at an appeal hearing because the employment
had terminated. If the elective theory were applied, the protection of the 1976 Act
could last until after an appeal hearing provided the employee had not elected to
terminate the contract before that date.7   The implied contractual duty to provide a
fair reference does not appear to apply to an ex-employee whose contract has been
                                                          
4  (1984) 6 FCR 177, 191-192; 55 ALR 63, 647-648. The court cited and followed a body of English
authority to which reference is made below.
5  E.g., in Australia, Ian Pinondang Siagian v Sanel Pty (1994) 1 IRCR 1 and in England, Hill v CA
Parsons & Co [1972] Ch. 305.
6  Rhys-Harper v Relaxion Group Plc  [2001] EWCA 634; [2001] IRLR 460  CA.
4terminated, and it would be important to know for that reason when the contract came
to an end.8
The choice between the theories has also had an important impact in the context of
statutory entitlements in English law. The definition of  a “dismissal”9 and the
occasion of the “effective date of termination”, “relevant date” and “act complained
of”10 affecting the time limits for making a claim for either unfair dismissal,
redundancy or disability discrimination respectively depend on the theory favoured by
the courts. For example, the definition of dismissal in the context of unfair dismissal
has been strongly influenced by the elective approach.11 In contrast, recognition has
been given to the strong arguments for the automatic approach in identifying time
limits.12  This theory offers greater certainty than the elective one because an
employee who claimed to have accepted the employers’ repudiation would be able to
argue that time ran from that later date.13 Yet on this very issue, at least in the context
of the anti-discrimination legislation, there has recently been a problematic divergence
of judicial opinion.14
                                                                                                                                                                     
7 Post Office v Adekeye [1997] ICR 100.
8  TSB Bank v Harris [2000] IRLR 157
9  For the purposes of ss 95 and 136 of the Employment Relations Act 1996.
10  Employment Rights Act 1996, ss.97 & 145 and the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, Sched 3
para 3 (1).
11  E.g., the courts have rejected the argument that employees who repudiate their contracts dismiss
themselves: London Transport Executive v Clarke [1981] ICR 355.
12   See J. McMullen, “A Synthesis of the Mode of Termination of the Contract of Employment”,
(1982) 41 Cambridge LJ 110
13   See Robert Cort & Son Ltd v Charman [1981] ICR 816, approved by the CA in Stapp v Shaftesbury
Society [1982] IRLR 326. The real issue is that it is not well-settled what amounts to an election to end
the contract and this partly explains why the automatic view has advantages in this context. See further
n.60 below.
14  In Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v Harley  [2001] ICR 927 whilst the EAT concluded
that ‘dismissal’ for the purposes of s. 4 (2) (d) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 included only
dismissal by the employer and not a constructive dismissal, it was alternatively prepared to hold that,
if this primary conclusion were wrong, time would run from the alleged repudiatory act of the
employer and not the employee’s acceptance of it, thereby favouring the automatic view.  In contrast,
in Derby Specialist Fabrication Ltd v Burton  [2001] ICR 833 the EAT appeared to favour the view
5In construing of reg 5 of the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment)
Regulations 198115 Lord Oliver, the only judge who averted to common law theories
of termination in Litster v Forth Dry Dock & Engineering Co. Ltd.16  acknowledged
that a contract survives a unilateral repudiation,17 but he considered nevertheless that,
for the purposes of the regulations, it was the transfer rather than the employee’s
acceptance of the breach that terminated the contract.18
 It is against this background that we turn to consider the extent to which each of the
theories adequately explains the rules actually applied by the courts.
The Automatic v. the Elective Theory of Termination
 (i) Automatic Theory
An automatic or unilateral theory of termination has been favoured by some members
of the judiciary because of the presumption against specific performance of a contract
                                                                                                                                                                     
that the Race Relations Act 1976 embraced a concept of constructive dismissal and that  time ran from
the employee’s resignation (acceptance) rather than from the earlier date of the discriminatory act
(although on the facts of the case this did not make a difference because the acts of discrimination
continued up until the termination). These decisions are noted by Dr D Rowland, “Discrimination and
Constructive Dismissal” (2001) 30  ILJ 381.
15   SI 1981 No 1794.
16   [1990] 1 AC 546. Lords Jauncey, Keith and Brandon concurred with Lord Oliver’s speech.
17   Ibid.  at p. 568
18   “..the effective cause of the dismissal is the transfer of the business, whether it be announced in
advance or contemporaneously, or whether it be unannounced, and it would be no misuse of ordinary
language in each case to speak of the termination of the contracts of the workforce as having been
effected by the transfer.” at p. 569.
6of employment.19 However, the objections to the automatic theory are numerous and
fundamental.
First, at the doctrinal level, it has been recognised that the presumption against the
specific performance of a contract of employment neither explains nor justifies a
theory of automatic termination.20 As Buckley LJ observed in Gunton v Richmond-on-
Thames LBC,21 there are many other contracts which cannot be specifically enforced
that are not subject to a doctrine of automatic termination: the orthodox elective rule
of contract is not displaced by the decision as to the appropriate remedy.22
At the level of policy, it can further be objected that the automatic theory releases a
wrongdoer, who has committed a fundamental breach of contract from further
performance.   This in effect shifts the control over the ending of the contract from the
innocent party - where it lies according to more orthodox elective contractual theory23
to the guilty party, thereby appearing to reward iniquity.
                                                          
19  The general rule against enforcement of a contract of employment means that the employee’s
remedy for a breach of contract by the employer normally sounds in damages.  In De Francesco v
Barnum (1890) 45 ChD 430, 438 Fry LJ stated that if performance of contracts were mandatory a
contract of employment would become a contract of "slavery", hence the courts have been unwilling to
hold that a contract survives a repudiation of the contract by either party to it. See e.g., Sanders v
Ernest A Neale Ltd  [1974] IRLR 236; Denmark Productions v Boscobel Productions; and Chappell v
Times Newspapers Ltd. [1975] ICR 145 and the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act
1992, s. 236.
20 K D Ewing, in  “Remedies for the Breach of the Contract of Employment”, (1993) 52 Cambridge
L.J. 405 at p. 410-411 rightly points out that the suggestion that an automatic theory is demanded by the
rule against specific performance results in circularity.
21  [1981] Ch 448, 468.
22  Indeed, according to the English common law, the presumption against the specific performance of a
contract for personal service is weakening:  e.g., Irani v Southampton and South West Hampshire HA
[1985] ICR 590;  Powell v Brent LBC  [1988] ICR 176.
 etc.
23  White & Carter (Councils) Ltd. v McGregor [1962] AC 413. Ewing’s proposition (above n. 20 at p.
412) supports this but it will be argued below that the argument that the preservation of these obligation
depends on the elective theory is flawed.
7“(This automatic approach)…. produces a result which seems to me to be far from
just. Why should a person who makes a contract of service have the right at any
moment to put an end to his contractual obligations?”24
The injustice is compounded, as far as innocent employees are concerned, by the
acknowledged rule that assesses their loss to minimise the burden of compensation
imposed upon the wrongdoing employer. This is considered below.
Thirdly, the enforcement of express and implied contractual restraints on illegitimate
competition by employees would be threatened by accepting the automatic theory as a
general explanation of termination in employment law.25  If the contract ended
automatically upon the employee's repudiation, it was thought that the employee
would be free of the restraining clause since that would have fallen with the other
contractual terms.26  If this were correct it was considered to have far-reaching
economic consequences depriving the employer of control over the post-termination
activities of employees who would find themselves at liberty to use a fundamental
breach of contract to re-position themselves in the market place by securing more
advantageous terms with a different employer.27  However, it will be suggested below
that this argument overlooks a number of classical precedents supporting a contrary
view that permits the enforcement of express or implied restraining terms even after
the contract has been terminated. We shall argue that the enforcement of restraint
                                                          
24  Thomas Marshall (Exports) Ltd. v Guinle, per  Sir Robert  Megarry V-C [1979] Ch 227 at p.240
25  Id, citing  inter alia, Lumley v Wagner (1852) 1 De G.M. & G. 604; William Robinson & Co Ltd. v
Heuer [1989] 2 Ch 451; Warner Bros Pictures Inc v Nelson [1937] 2 KB 209.
26 Thomas Marshall (Exports) Ltd. v Guinle,  above n.24.
27 As we shall see below, the same difficulty can apply in cases of elective termination, so that the
solution to post-termination enforcement arises independently of whichever theory is adopted and
justifies neither.
8clauses has been possible when employees have left after giving due notice and so
cannot be dependent on the continued existence of the contract of employment.
Fourthly, as the automatic theorists acknowledge, the theory does not explain the
conventional approach in purported unilateral variation cases where the employer
repudiates the contract by action falling short of outright dismissal. In these cases, the
employer’s motivation is not to dismiss the worker outright, but to continue to employ
them under new arrangements that alter the legal relationship under which work is
provided.  The weight of the authorities insists that employees normally entitled to
rely on the status quo ante any purported unilateral modification of the contract.28
The variation cases are normally conceptualised within the elective model but,   as we
shall see below, the authorities lack consistency.29  In comparison with the alternative
theory, the elective approach does have a greater attraction. If it were otherwise, and
an automatic theory applied in variation cases, it would be highly destructive of
bargain security. Employers could unilaterally propose fundamentally altered terms
that would thereupon terminate the existing contract of employment.  A unilateral
reduction in wages for example, would destroy the former contract notwithstanding
the objections of the employee. If the employees presented themselves for work the
following day they would be accepting a new contract incorporating the revised term.
                                                          
28     Shaw LJ, who advocated the automatic theory, admitted that a different approach would be
required in variation cases, which he called cases of "oblique" repudiation in Gunton v. Richmond-on-
Thames LBC ,  [1981[] Ch 448, at p. 459.
29  The bilateral approach can be identified in such decisions as D A Coleman v S & W Baldwin [1977]
IRLR 342; Industrial Rubber Products v Gillon  [1977] IRLR 389; Tucker v British Leyland Motor
Corpn. [1978] IRLR 493; Burdett-Coutts v Hertfordshire CC [1984] IRLR 91; Gibbons v Associated
British Ports  [1985] IRLR 376; Williams v Hereford and Worcester CC [1985] IRLR 505 and  Rigby v
Ferodo Ltd.  [1987] IRLR 516.   
9This would create what some US jurists sometimes describe as an "administrative
model" of the contract of employment. 30
Finally, the automatic theory relies to a great extent upon the idea that the
performance of work is the consideration for wages. This was given particular
emphasis in Gunton  where Shaw LJ re-iterated the rule that the employee, when
confronted with a summary and wrongful dismissal, is unable to continue working,
and for that reason they cannot  recover damages in respect of work that has not been
performed. This states an orthodox principle of both English and Australian law that if
the employer, in breach of contract, refuses to permit the performance of work no
claim for wages can be brought.31  But it would, of course, be different if the
consideration for wages is not the actual performance of work but, instead, a
willingness to perform the work. Thus it becomes important to ask: what is the
consideration for wages?  We shall consider this point further below because it goes to
the heart of the rules governing termination.
(ii) The Elective Theory
In rejecting the automatic theory as inconsistent with both principle and precedent Sir
Robert Megarry V-C in Thomas Marshall (Exports) Ltd. v Guinle32 held that a
contract of employment is not an exception to the general rule governing commercial
                                                          
30 H. H. Perritt Jnr, Employee Dismissal Law and Practice, § 4.44 (3d ed. 1992) and see, for example,
Re Certified Question, Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting Co  432 Mich 438; 443 N.W.2d 112. (Mich.
1989)
31  E.g., Denmark Productions v Boscobel Productions [1969] 1 QB 699;  Ian Pinondang Siagian v.
Sanel Pty (1994) 1 IRCR 1.
32 [1979] 1 Ch 227.
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contracts. This influential decision has, of course, been followed and applied many
times in both the English and Australian jurisdictions.33  The termination of the
contract following a repudiatory breach occurs only upon the election of the injured
party; the contract does not end upon the occurrence of the fundamental breach nor by
virtue of that breach.
According to the weight of modern authority, the innocent party is now considered to
have control over whether and when the legal relationship should end.  This is said to
justify and explain the rules permitting the employer to control the activities of
employees post-termination.34 For example, an elective approach underpins those
decisions in which an employer may obtain an interlocutory injunction restraining an
employee, in breach of an exclusivity clause, from working for another during the
contractual notice period. The contract continues, and the employer is bound to pay
wages due until contractual notice expires, although the employee is no-longer bound
to be ready and willing to work.35  Where the contract contains an exclusivity clause
and an express restraint clause, an employee may, in some cases, be prevented from
                                                          
33 Examples include Gunton v. Richmond-on-Thames LBC  above, n.21; London Transport Executive v
Clarke [1981] IRLR 166; Shook v. Ealing LBC [1986] IRLR 46; Dietman v Brent LBC [1987] IRLR
259 upheld by CA [1988] IRLR 842. A recently reported English example is White v Bristol Rugby Ltd.
[2002] IRLR 204, and see also  further  decisions discussed below. But note that in  Octavius Atkinson
& Sons Ltd v Morris  [1989] ICR 431, 436, Sir N. Browne-Wilkinson V-C considered that the law had
not yet made a clear choice between the two theories and that the controversy remained unresolved. The
automatic theory was applied in that case although the court indicated a willingness to have considered
the alternative had it been properly pleaded.    In Australia the elective approach has been applied in
such important decisions as Re Turner and the Australian Coal and Shale Employees Federation etc
(1984) 55ALR 635 and Ian Pinondang Siagian v Sanel Pty (1994) 1 IRCR 1.  The elective theory was
well-precedented before Guinle was decided. See e.g. Boston Deep Sea Fishing and Ice Co. v Ansell
(1888) 39 Ch.D. 339 esp at p. 365 and Lumley v. Wagner (1852) 1 De G.M. & G. 604; William
Robinson & Co Ltd. v Heuer[1898] 2 Ch 451; Warner Bros Pictures Incorporated v Nelson [1937] 1
KB 209.
34 Thomas Marshall (Exports) Ltd. v Guinle, above n.24.
35  Evening Standard Co. Ltd v Henderson [1987] IRLR 64.  Where the repudiation takes the form of a
failure by the employer to follow a contractual or statutory procedure prior to dismissal.   The dismissal
may be a nullity:  Irani v Southampton and South West Hampshire HA [1985] ICR 590; Shook v Ealing
LBC [1986] IRLR 46 at p.50.
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leaving to work for a rival employer in breach of a contractual notice period, even if
this means keeping him or her idle and on “garden leave” throughout the notice
period.36 These are illustrative of the principles thought to derive from an elective
approach.  However, not all problems are resolved by it. For example there is the rule
that notice, once given, is irrevocable; it cannot be retracted  even before it has been
accepted.37
Notwithstanding that the elective theory has become the dominant one, it is no more a
convincing explanation of the rules actually applied by the courts than was the
automatic view. First, the judiciary are inconsistent in its application, leading to a
profound lack of legal coherence in the authorities. As noted above, the variation
cases are an important and disturbing example of this. The accepted view is that such
cases are located within the elective model: in the absence of consent to a proposed
change, an “offer” of new terms is ineffective to alter the contract and the status quo
ante the “offer” is preserved.38  The dominance of the elective approach in this
context might suggest that automatic theory was only ever intended to apply to cases
of outright dismissal. However, this possibility appears to be doubtful because there
are important English authorities that suggest that a unilateral repudiation falling short
                                                          
36  Symbian v. Christensen  [2001] IRLR 77.  Much depends on the interest the employer seeks to
protect:  e.g., Provident Financial Group plc v Hayward [1989] 3 All ER 298 and William-Hill
Organisation Ltd. v Tucker [1998] IRLR 313.
37  Riordan v  War Office [1959] 3 All ER 552; aff’d [1960] 3 All ER 774. This was a point  raised by
J. McMullen in “A Synthesis of the Mode of Termination of the Contract of Employment” (above n.12)
at p. 123  although he argued that the rule only applies because the notice is lawful under the terms of
the contract. This is  a point which, however, he concedes may not have been judicially accepted:
Murphy v Birrell & Sons [1978] IRLR 458.
38  Marriott v Oxford & District Co-Operative Society Ltd (No.2)  [1970] 1 QB 186; Rigby v Ferodo
[1987] IRLR 516; Burdett-Coutts v Hertfordshire CC   [1984] IRLR  91.
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of an outright dismissal39 can be described as a “withdrawal” of the contract. This
“withdrawal” is, of itself, effective to terminate the contract.   This draws heavily on
the unilateralist, automatic, approach that threatens to re-introduce that a model of
employment that has been rejected in the majority of the state jurisdictions of the
United States.40
The decisions in Hogg v Dover College,41 Jones v Governing Body of Burdett Coutts
School42and Alcan Extrusions v Yates43 decide that compensation for unfair dismissal
may be available where the employer purportedly varies the contract in the face of
express objections by the employee who seeks to preserve the benefits of the existing
contract.
In Hogg, the Head of History at a school was forcibly downgraded to act as an
ordinary part-time teacher. This was conceptualised either as an express dismissal
within s. 95 (1) (a) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 or as a constructive dismissal
within s.95 (1) (c) which the employee accepted by serving the originating
application.
In Jones, on similar legal facts, a purported unilateral variation affecting the
contractual job function seems to have been treated as a constructive dismissal.  The
major point, unsuccessfully taken on appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal
                                                          
39  As we shall see, these even  include cases where  the job was unaltered.
40  Discussed by B. Hough and A. Spowart-Taylor, “Employment Policies: a Lesson from America"
(2001) 30 Common Law World Review   297-319.
41 [1990] ICR 39.
42 [1997] ICR 390.
43 [1996] IRLR. 327.
13
(EAT) need not detain us. It was whether, having accepted alternative employment
following a redundancy the employee’s right to claim unfair dismissal was removed
by statute rather than the variation.44  Nevertheless, the decision would appear to fit
within an automatic view because the employee did not accept the repudiatory breach
committed by the employer when it indicated that he was going to be dismissed, yet
the unilateral variation regarding his function was held to be effective to end the
contract.45
In Alcan, the breach of contract was identified as a unilateral change in a shift pattern
allied to consequential changes in shift premiums.  The complexity in this case arose
because the employees did not pursue a common law claim. They sought to continue
the existing employment relationship without prejudice to their legal rights and yet
pursue unfair dismissal claims. The difficulty   was that a finding of constructive
dismissal was not open to the Employment Appeal Tribunal because each employee
had not sought to terminate the contract but rather to preserve its existence by
objecting to the change.
The English tribunals departed from orthodoxy and treated the employer's behaviour
as if its purpose was to end the employment relationship.  In following and applying
Hogg the EAT decided that unfair dismissal compensation can be available,
depending on the facts, to protect the fundamental changes in contract even though the
employment relationship continued. It identified the dismissal, upon which a claim is
                                                          
44   See now Employment Rights Act 1996, s.138.
45  An objection to the EAT’s reasoning in Jones  concerned the Governors’ warning that 12 weeks
notice would be served if the employee  declined the new job.  This was presumably a notice of a future
intention to end the contract according to its term.   If so, it could be argued that there was no
repudiatory breach.
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necessarily contingent, as a dismissal within s. 95 (1) (a) of the 1996 Act, that is, a
termination of the contract by the employer. It reasoned that a fundamental breach was
capable of constituting on the facts a “withdrawal” of the contract of employment.46
This “withdrawal” of course describes unilateral behaviour.   In other words, the court
treated a purported fundamental modification of the contract as, by itself, sufficient to
end the contract.   The implications of this reasoning are quite significant:
(i) Even if the employees had not objected to the new shift patterns, and had continued
to work   without objection, the employer would still, in law, have dismissed the
employees because their contracts had been withdrawn, and it must have been liable
in each case to pay at least a basic award. That is an unavoidable consequence of
applying the automatic theory in such purported variation cases
(ii) The employees had probably been advised to object in writing to the proposed
change  and to work the new shifts under protest. This advice was clearly designed to
avoid any suggestion of implied consent to the proposed change once the new shifts
began.   But this is only necessary where the courts are applying an elective approach.
The reasoning that the contract was “withdrawn” means the employees were not
                                                          
46  The courts in Australia seem to recognise a similar distinction between a withdrawal of a contract
and a mere purported unilateral variation of it. In Quinn v Jack Chia [1992] 1 VR 567, 577-578, His
Honour Justice Ashley observed  "... the change to the plaintiff's situation (after the purported variation)
was exceptional, far reaching, not within the original contemplation of the parties and not
comprehended by the contract initially made between them; and that it did give rise to the institution of
a fresh contract of service between the plaintiff and the defendant rather than merely a variation of that
earlier agreement".  In Bradshaw v Bob Garnett Real Estate Pty Ltd (1995) Case 960275  Industrial
Relations Court of Australia,  this was interpreted to mean that a proposal that profoundly alters the
employee's duties or responsibilities should more readily lead to a finding that a new contract is being
offered. This decision strikes an interesting parallel with Alcan, revealing a similar approach in each
jurisdiction.
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required to withhold their consent because the contract ended automatically when
“withdrawn”.  Their consent or lack of it is irrelevant; the contract had ended.
(iii) The court decided that whether a purported change amounts to a withdrawal of
the contract and thus a dismissal is a question of fact.  The danger with this reasoning
is that, because of the facts in Alcan, any purported modification could place the
employer in immediate peril of unfair dismissal claim.  Otherwise stated, and
notwithstanding the caveat that dismissal is a question of fact, the circumstances of
Alcan seem to equate most, if not all, variation cases as cases of dismissal. This is
clearly too broad a rule and inconsistent with the “elective” principles governing
variation cases.
It might tentatively be argued that Hogg is more satisfactory than Alcan because the
facts concerned altering the job function in a fundamental sense and so a dismissal
could more readily be seen to have occurred.47 In Hogg the contract of the Head of
History was terminated and his function radically altered when he became a part-time
teacher.  In Alcan the issue is merely one of changing terms short of altering function,
in other words it was a change in the manner in which work was done.  Unfair
dismissal compensation is not the appropriate remedy where the proposed change
affects the manner in which the work is remunerated or otherwise organised.48 The
appropriate cause of action should have been a common law action for damages as in
                                                          
47  The problem is, of course that this argument acknowledges the unsatisfactory solution that
distinctions can derived somewhat arbitrarily according to  the issues of fact and degree.
48   However, a proposed change affecting the place in which work is done could be a dismissal because
a proposed  re-location to a distant place could affect the employee’s ability to perform his or her
contractual function.
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such well-known English authorities as Rigby v Ferodo49 unless the employees
accepted the repudiation by resigning and seeking compensation for unfair
constructive dismissal.
The only permissible conclusion from these decisions is that elective principles are
not fully rooted in employment law, so that even in the variation cases, which are
normally resolved along bilateral lines, unilateral behaviour can be effective to
terminate a contract
(iii)  Further Problems with the Elective Approach.
But a lack of coherence in the extent of its reception in the English authorities is not
the only problem affecting the elective theory.  More fundamentally, it is internally
incoherent. It will be recalled that the underlying purpose of the theory is to import
into employment law the orthodox rules of contract law. However, the version of the
elective theory actually introduced (when applied at all) is a highly modified one;
indeed, the theory only partially succeeds in ousting the automatic approach. Bizarrely
it seems to accept that some (but not all) obligations can end automatically.  The
following dictum makes this clear:
If a servant is dismissed and excluded from his employment, it is absurd to suppose
that he still occupies the status of a servant. Quite plainly he does not. The
                                                          
49 [1987] IRLR 516.
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relationship of master and servant has been broken, albeit wrongfully by one side
alone.50
This signifies that an outright dismissal, of itself, ends the “status” of employee. But
what does this mean?
“As the relationship of master and servant is gone, the servant cannot claim the
reward for services no longer rendered. But it does not follow that every right and
obligation under the contract is extinguished. An obligation which is not of necessity
dependent on the existence of the relationship of master and servant may well
survive….” 51
The court here is advancing the orthodox rule that a wrongfully dismissed employee is
unable to claim wages subsequent to the dismissal.  Of course this collides with the
logic of the elective approach that would otherwise suggest that all the rights and
obligations are preserved until the innocent employee elects to terminate the contract.
In order to strain the elective theory to accommodate a rule which is in fact inimical to
it, the electivists purport to contrast the operation of the employment relationship with
the contract of employment.52 They are forced to concede to the automatic theorists
                                                          
50  per Brightman LJ in Gunton v. Richmond-on-Thames LBC , above n.21 at p. 474.  Contrast  Hogg v
Dover College [1990] ICR 39, 42 “The trite law is that of course employment results from a contract. It
is the contract at which one has to look and not the relationship of the employer and employee.”
51  Id at  p. 475.
52 There is Australian authority doubting the distinction between relationship and employment:
APESMA v Skilled Engineering Pty Ltd (1994) 1 IRCR 106 per Gray J at pp. 113-115 but English and
Australian common law rules now seem to be consistent: Automatic Fire Sprinklers Pty. Ltd. v Watson
(1946) 72 CLR 435,  followed in Byrne  v Australian Airlines Ltd. (1995) 185 CLR 410; 131 ALR 422
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that the relationship of employment is subject to unilateral or automatic termination,
whilst the contract of employment survives the repudiation until an election is made.
It has not, however, been clearly explained what is meant by the “status” or
“relationship” of employment as opposed to the various rights and obligations of the
contract of employment. It is a deeply problematic distinction because it is the
contract that constitutes and defines the employment relationship; arguably there can
be no employment relationship independent of a contract: they stand or fall together.53
On the assumption that a free-standing and non-contractual concept of relationship
can be erected, it is difficult to identify what its content might be. What rights and
duties are enshrined within it and what is their jurisprudential basis?54
In the terms in which the electivists make the argument, the employment relationship
seems at least to refer to the obligation to work and the duty to pay wages for that
work. This is arguably so because it is these co-relative obligations that the electivists
accept end upon the repudiatory breach, although it is probable that other legal
obligations might also be included within this framework of automatic termination.55
But the essential point is this: even within the elective theory some (but not all)
                                                          
53  Contrast Motorola Ltd v. Davidson [2001] IRLR 4 where the court held that where a worker has a
contract of services with an employment agency but is directed to work for a particular employer, and
to obey reasonable instructions from that employer, an employment relationship may exist between the
employer and the worker notwithstanding the absence of a contractual relationship between them,
provided the receiving employer has a sufficient de facto control over the worker. However, in this case
the court was perhaps concerned, as a matter of public policy, not to permit the interposition of third
parties to evade statutory rights.
54 As Gray J. observed in the APESMA decision  in Australia, (above n. 52) the “relationship” of
vendor and purchaser is unknown to the law and why should employment be different?
55 E.g. the duty to provide a safe system of working, at least in the case of an outright dismissal. A
repudiation  that constitutes merely an offer of a new fundamental term, would , of course, be treated
otherwise where work continues to be provided.
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contractual obligations end automatically. The elective theory is thus an incomplete
explanation of the common law rules.
(iv) The Elective Theory and the Assessment of Loss
We have already shown how the elective theory permits an employee who has not
consented to a breach of contract by the employer to recover damages for breach of
contract representing the value of the lost entitlements.56 In the present context, we are
primarily concerned with entitlements following an outright dismissal because it is
here also that  the elective theory has failed to oust the automatic view.  The latter’s
survival is  evident in relation to the assessment of the innocent employee’s loss.
Before examining this issue, however, it is necessary to make some preliminary
remarks on recent developments in English law.
After  Malik v BCCI57 an employee may recover damages for breach of the implied
duty to maintain trust and confidence where the employer’s conduct, such as the
fraudulent operation of the business, has caused damage to reputation compromising
the employee’s future employment prospects. However, after the decision of the
House of Lords in Johnson v Unisys Ltd58 it is clear that an employee cannot rely on
breach of the same implied duty  to claim  special damages for financial losses, such
as lost earnings, following the termination. Their Lordships held that to have allowed
such a claim to arise upon dismissal would have circumvented the statutory law of
unfair dismissal, in particular by evading the time limits and limits on the maximum
amount of compensation recoverable.
                                                          
56   E.g Rigby v Ferodo Ltd. [1987] IRLR 516.
57   [1997] IRLR 462.
58  [2001] 2 All ER 801, noted H Collins (2001) 30 ILJ 305.
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The important feature of Johnson was that it was not  argued on the grounds that there
was an unaccepted repudiatiory breach which was incapable, by itself, of destroying
the contract. This is important because  it will be argued below that the employee may
sustain a claim in respect of wages which (had the “relationship” continued) should
have been earned after the repudiation and, further, that this right survives until the
election to terminate the contract is made.  Their Lordships’ decision does not
consider the consequences of applying an elective theory of termination to the
entitlement to receive unpaid wages accruing until the date of the acceptance of the
breach. It is to this issue that we now turn.
(v) The  Elective Theory and Entitlement to Wages.
When the elective theory is applied in commercial contracts the innocent party is
entitled to "expectation damages" placing them in the position they might have been
in had the contract been performed.  Applied to a case of outright dismissal, this
would obviously entitle the dismissed employee to recover the value of wages not
earned from the dismissal/repudiation until the time of the acceptance of alternative
work.59 This is so because it is only upon that event, the acceptance of the breach, that
the employee could be said to have ended the contract.60
However, the rules actually developed sit uneasily with an orthodox version of the
elective theory.  It is important at this stage to recall that one of the purposes of
                                                          
59  From this payment will be deducted any amount which he earned in alternative employment (or
through his or her fault failed to earn) during the period of notice.
60 This is so because by accepting alternative work the employee is making it impossible to fulfil the
obligation to provide work under the original contract.  However, there are other possibilities. An
election to treat the contract as at an end could be made, for example,  by issuing proceedings to seek
compensation or damages in respect of the dismissal. Alternatively a court may find, as it did in
Gunton, (above n.21) that the election is made at the trial.
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introducing this theory into employment law was to attribute the ending of the
contract to the actions of the innocent party. In other words, one of its key purposes
was to avoid rewarding the guilty party who might otherwise be freed from a
burdensome contract merely by breaching it.
Problematically, the orthodox rules in employment law are fundamentally opposed to
this beau ideal. This is because the innocent party’s losses are assessed in a limited
way that deprives them of the real benefit that the elective theory would seem
logically to provide.61  The employee’s losses are calculated on the assumption that
employers would have exercised any power they may have had to bring the contract to
an end in the way most beneficial to themselves, albeit that, by breaching the contract,
they have not done so.62  This means that damages are not assessed on the basis of
what the ill-advised employer actually did, but on what the employee might have
received if the employer had respected its duties under the contract (which ex
hypothesi it did not).  The courts have thus overlooked the tenets of the caveat emptor
principle by forging a rule that permits damages to be assessed according to the length
of the contractual notice period (subject to an even earlier cut-off for a failure to
mitigate).   It follows that this is a period that may often expire before any election the
innocent party makes or is deemed to have made.63
                                                          
61  English and Australian common law is consistent on this point see Gunton v Richmond-upon-
Thames LBC , above n.21 and in Automatic Fire Sprinklers Pty. Ltd. v Watson (1946) 72 CLR 435.
62  Gunton  above n.21, per Buckley LJ at 469  and see, for example,  Boyo v Lambeth LBC  [1995]
IRLR 50.
63  The election may occur either when the employee puts it beyond his or her power to offer further
performance by accepting alternative employment or, for example, by bringing proceedings for unfair
dismissal In Gunton , the election was found to have been made at the trial. In Shook v Ealing LBC
[1986] IRLR 46, 51 the EAT unsurprisingly thought that it might, depending on the facts, occur earlier,
but it “could hardly…come any later.”  It seems the orthodox rule that the election must be
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The stated purpose of the elective theory is to protect the innocent party, and yet the
rules on quantum reward the iniquitous employer, depriving the employee of almost
all the economic value the elective theory might have afforded.64 When an employer
has acted in breach of contract by not giving notice it might be asked why should he or
she be protected by being deemed to have done so?
But this does not conclude the matter, for it can be argued that the restrictions on
damages for wrongfully dismissed employees are inconsistent with principle.  As we
have seen, the explanation for the restriction on damages lies in the supposed rule that
wages and work go together. A wrongfully dismissed employee does not work, and is
thought not to be entitled to pay.  In sum, the employee is thought to be unable to
recover wages because work has not actually been performed.   Thus it is common
ground between elective and automatic theories that there is a necessary link between
the actual performance of work and an entitlement to wages. The theories converge at
this point.   This is why, in Gunton, Buckley LJ, although espousing an elective view,
observed that in practice the employee would have no option but to make the election
and treat the contract as at an end: it would be futile to continue the contract in many
cases.65
                                                                                                                                                                     
communicated applies, although communication can be by words or conduct: Octavius Atkinson & Sons
Ltd v Morris  [1989] ICR 431, 436.
64 A cynical view might argue that the real purpose of the elective theory is that it is a perceived
justification for employers to control the activities of employees who compete after leaving
employment.  Thus the elective theory can produce different results according to the nature of the
interest that it is sought to protect.  The law thus gives greatest weight to the proprietary interests of
employers, rather than to the livelihood of individual employees. However, it will be argued below that
the elective theory is a somewhat unconvincing explanation even for the rules on post-termination
competition by employees.
65  Per Buckley LJ in Gunton above n. 21 at p. 469.
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However, these arguments fail if the consideration for wages is not the actual
performance of work but merely being ready and willing to work.   If that is so  two
important consequences follow:
•  the wrongfully dismissed employee would be entitled to recover in debt a sum
representing the value of the wages that ought to have been paid after the repudiation
until the election is made to end the contract. Because this is  an action in debt no duty
to mitigate  arises;    
•   employers who wish to avoid these consequences must end the contract by giving
due notice under it. This would reduce the damages payable provided that this implied
or express contractual notice expires before the employee makes the election.  This
meets the objection that might have arisen after Johnson that an employee might, by
choosing not to end the contract, seek to enforce a substantial claim that would have
exceeded what was available under the law of unfair dismissal. The employer can
prevent this simply by giving due notice thereby bringing the contract to an end before
a claim  for wages for a substantial period could accrue, although that would depend,
of course, upon the duration of the contractual notice period and the employer’s
decision to rely on it.
The Consideration for Wages
Surprisingly, for the point is a fundamental one, the courts have not been consistent in
resolving what the consideration for wages is.  One view is that work must actually be
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performed before a claim to wages can be sustained.66 Alternatively, it has been seen
to be more consistent with laissez-faire principles that the parties should determine for
themselves that which must be furnished in exchange for wages. Limited Australian
and English authority holds that the question of consideration is resolved simply as a
matter of construing the contract.67
However, because it will be difficult in many cases to identify the intention of the
parties, the English courts appear to have consistently adopted a broad default position
that treats willingness to work, rather than the actual performance of work, as entitling
the employee to wages.68  There is some Australian authority to a similar effect
although, as in England, the issue has not been without difficulty.69
Support for the general principle that work and wages are not inexorably bound
together can be found in diverse authorities. For example, there is the rule that, in the
absence of an express term, there is no common law right for the employer to suspend
                                                          
66 See e.g.,  per Greer J. in Browning v Crumlin Valley Collieries [1926] 1 KB 522 at p. 528: “The
consideration for work is wages, and the consideration for wages is work.”
67  E.g.,  Atkinson J. in Petrie v Macfisheries [1940] 1 KB  258 at 269, followed by the New South
Wales Industrial Relations Commission in Swift Placements Pty Ltd.v Workcover Authority of New
South Wales (Louisa May) [2000] NSWIRComm 9 citing, inter alia, Latham CJ in Automatic Fire
Sprinklers Pty. Ltd. v Watson (1946) 72 CLR 435, 452-453.
68  It perhaps not settled whether the authorities that favour this approach treat it as a rule or as liable to
be overridden by a contrary intention. Arguably, the latter is more consistent with principle.
69  See generally, Automatic Fire Sprinklers Pty. Ltd. v Watson (1946) 72 CLR 435.  “It  is  only in an
exceptional case where the payment  of money to the servant does not depend upon his doing work,
that the  servant  can recover remuneration without daily  work.  He cannot remain idle, even though he
truly alleges readiness  and  willingness to do the work and claim wages or salary as  if  he had  done
the  work.” per  Latham  C.J. at p 452;   “The common understanding of a contract of employment at
wages or salary periodically is that it is the service that earns the remuneration…” per Dixon J.,  at pp
465-466, although he  admitted  that, as one of several  exceptions, an entitlement to wages can be
enforced for a period spent on  annual leave: at p. 446.  However, as in England, an employee who
refuses to work according to the contract cannot claim wages: Australian National Airlines Commission
v Robinson [1977] VR 87 esp. 91.
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without pay.70  The entitlement to be paid arises in such cases because the employee is
willing to work, but was prevented by the employer from performing that work.
The courts also seem to have been aware that if entitlement to wages only arises on
the performance of work it would work injustice since employees normally have no
right to be given work. According to the famous dictum of Asquith J:
"Provided I pay my cook her wages she cannot complain if I choose to take any or all
of my meals out."71
 If consideration for wages were the actual performance of work, the cook would not,
of course, be entitled to be paid even if she had been willing, although unable, to cook
the meal.
These same principles endure in more recent English case-law.  In Beveridge v KLM
(UK) Ltd.72 it was held that if the employer closes the business over Christmas, the
employees are entitled, unless the contract stated otherwise, to be paid despite having
done no work.
Of course, the entitlement to wages does not arise in every case that work is not
performed. The English common law clearly recognises a distinction between an
involuntary failure to perform the work, which does not disentitle the employee to
wages, and a voluntary failure which does.   For example, the taking of industrial
                                                          
70 Hanley v Pease & Partners Ltd. [1915] 1 KB 698.
71  Collier v. Sunday Referee Publishing Co. [1940] 2 KB 647 at 650
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action, constituting a refusal to work in breach of contract, bars an employee from
claiming wages.73  But in the case of sickness (at least prior to the modern English law
as it was established in Mears v. Safecar74) a contractual entitlement to sick pay
during a temporary illness was not thought to be depend upon the express or implied
obligations of the contract of employment: the early common law rule was that by
being willing, albeit unable to work, an employee was entitled to receive wages during
temporary sickness because he or she had supplied the necessary consideration.75
 There is, however, one ill-defined exception where a mere willingness to work is
insufficient to found a claim to wages. This arises where the employer is not at fault
for its failure to allow the employee to work. This can be seen in Browning v. Crumlin
Valley Collieries Ltd76 In this case it will be recalled that the employer prevented
miners working in unsafe conditions by laying-off without pay until the mine was
repaired.  The refusal to pay wages was, on these facts, held to be justified by the
existence of an implied term.77
                                                                                                                                                                     
72 [2000]  IRLR 765.
73  E.g., Sim v Rotherham MBC [1986] Ch 216; Miles v Wakefield MDC [1987] AC 539.  It seems that
in Australia employers have a statutory duty to withhold pay during industrial action: s.187AA of the
Workplace Relations Act 1996.
74 [1983] ICR 626. It was decided here that sick pay was to be regulated by an express or implied
agreement; thus by implication a willingness to work is not seen as consideration for wages at least
where there is evidence that of a contrary intention. However, in deciding that where there was no clear
evidence of the intention of the parties and the matter should be resolved in favour of sick pay
entitlement perhaps suggests a residual reliance on the default position governing the doctrine of
consideration in employment cases.
75 Cuckson v Stones (1858) 1 El. & El. 248, followed in Warren v Whitingham (1902) 18 Times LR
508; and see also Storey v. Fulham Steel Works Co. (1907) 24 Times LR 89 and Niblett v Midland Ry.
Co.  96 LT 462.
76 [1926] 1 KB 522.
77  There is a lack of definition in this rule because Devonald v. Rosser & Sons [1906] 2 KB 728
decides that  an employer cannot lay-off without pay due to a decline in trade, even if the lack of
profitability  is not due to its fault.  This suggests that the rules are founded independently of  fault.
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In conclusion, an employee who is willing to work, but who is prevented by the
employer from doing so without just cause, is entitled to receive his or her wages.
The rule that a wrongfully dismissed employee’s compensable loss is only the loss of
wages during the notice period is thus exposed as lacking a sound basis in principle.
The consequence of this is that it profoundly alters the version of the elective theory
applied in employment law.  In particular, it casts doubt on the rule governing the
measure of damages that a wrongfully dismissed employee should not be able to
receive the value of their wages from the date of the repudiation. On the contrary, it
provides strong and consistent authority for the view that such an employee should be
entitled to recover in debt the value of wages from the wrongful dismissal or
repudiatory breach of contract until the date at which the employee puts further
performance of the contract out of their hands.78
This conclusion is not affected by  Johnson v Unisys Ltd79  because it does not require
any reliance upon an implied obligation to sustain the claim; indeed, unlike Johnson,
it requires no extension of liability: it is an issue that straightforwardly engages  the
question of the entitlement to wages. It can additionally  be argued that Johnson
should not be read as limiting common law rules governing the law of wrongful
dismissal since this form of action, unlike that  raised in Johnson, is not concerned
with the manner of dismissal,  and thus survived parliament’s intervention.   It is
                                                          
78  This, of course, advances the law beyond the point reached in Rigby v Ferodo [1987] IRLR 516
because there is a continuing right to receive wages notwithstanding that the duty to serve has been
ended automatically.
79
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simply argued here that the restrictions on recovery of wages at common law for
wrongful  are inconsistent with principle.80
A Disaggregated Contract
We have seen how, in many employment contexts, the courts have decided to adopt as
orthodoxy a bilateral, elective, approach ostensibly derived from the ordinary law of
contract, albeit that it has been highly revised when compared to the orthodox
principles governing the termination of commercial contracts. We have already stated,
but it is important to re-iterate here, that one of the reasons for doing so was to prevent
the party repudiating the contract from acquiring an illegitimate advantage by being
able to escape their obligations merely by committing a fundamental breach. This was
particularly problematic in the case of restraint clauses that, it was felt, would not be
enforceable if an automatic theory represented the law.  Sir Robert Megarry V-C made
this point explicitly in Guinle:
“... if the doctrine of automatic determination is good law, all that Johanna Wagner,
Heuer and Bette Davis had to do was to say that their contracts were at an end, and
so they were free from the contractual restrictions that applied while their
employment continued.”81
                                                          
80  This is a more modest contention than arguing that the measure of damages should reflect the
employee’s disappointment in having the contract of employment terminated prematurely and for that
reason  assessing damages according to  period for which it was likely that the contract would otherwise
have continued, for normally, although perhaps not universally, the award will be significantly less.
81 [1979] Ch 227 at p 241.  His lordship was referring to Lumley v. Wagner (1852) 1 De G.M. & G.
604; William Robinson & Co Ltd. v Heuer [1898] 2 Ch 451; Warner Bros Pictures Incorporated v
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This reasoning suggests that restraint and exclusivity clauses can only be enforced
during the continuation of the contract, and that once the contract is ended their
enforcement becomes impossible. In other words, an employer wishing to rely on such
clauses should not accept the breach by the employee and so treat the contract as at an
end, for these clauses will necessarily stand or fall with the remainder of the contract.
Thus, according to the orthodox view, only the elective theory is capable of furnishing
protection for employers in relation to the post-termination activities of the employee
and only then if the innocent employer elects to preserve the contract.
However, this reasoning is open to  objection because it is manifestly inconsistent
with many well-established authorities. The enforcement of restraint clauses has never
been made contingent upon the continued existence of the contract of employment.  If
it were otherwise the employer would be vulnerable whenever the contract were
terminated lawfully, for example by the giving of due notice. Only the few employees
who declined to give due notice would be caught: others would not be subject to these
clauses because ex hypothesi their contracts would have ended  by the giving of notice
leaving no foundation to justify the employer's enforcement proceedings. By the same
reasoning, if the employee were to  “walk off the job” without notice, even under the
terms of the elective theory, the employer could lose the protection of a restraint
clause if a replacement worker were engaged.82
                                                                                                                                                                     
Nelson [1937] 1 KB 209 in which employers had been able to prevent employees from working for
rival employers in breach of ‘ negative’ stipulations in their contracts of employment.
82  For engaging a replacement could be seen as an acceptance of the employee's breach because the
employer would thereby be putting it out of its power to re-instate the employee.  Thus the contract
would have ended by the time the employer sought to enforce the restraint clause.
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It is trite law that the courts have not so restricted the enforcement of such clauses.
There are numerous decisions in which the employee has ended the employment
contract and yet the employer has subsequently successfully invoked a restraining
clause.83    Indeed, in Herbert Morris Ltd v Saxelby84 there had been an intervening
employment prior to the successful action by the employer. In each of these cases it
was clearly unnecessary to keep the contract alive to preserve the restraint or
exclusivity clause, which means that the enforcement of these clauses arises
independently of a continuing contract. One of the fundamental purposes of the
elective theory is accordingly  undermined to that extent.
Once it is realised that such fundamental obligations exist independently of the
continued existence of the contract there are important consequences for our
understanding of the theories governing the termination of contracts. Arguably,
neither the automatic nor the elective view of contract can be satisfactory since neither
accommodates the rules on restraint of trade.   Whether the termination be held to
have occurred under the automatic or an elective view makes no difference in this
context: obligations can be enforced independently of either theory after the contract
has ceased.   It is must therefore be appropriate to search for a more convincing
explanation of the rules.
A New Approach
                                                          
83Roger Bullivant Ltd v Ellis [1987] IRLR 464; Fitch v Dewes [1921] 2 AC 158; Leng v Andrews
[1909] 1 Ch 763; Robb v Green [1895] 2 QB 315.
84 [1916] 1 AC 688
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Whilst we have accepted that the elective theory is the dominant explanation of  the
rules governing the termination of a contract of employment we have argued that the
version of the theory applied by the courts has been based upon a misconception of
the consideration for wages. The first element of this new approach is therefore that
whilst for most purposes  contracts end bilaterally, it has been inconsistent with
principle to deny employees the right to recover the value of their wages from the date
of the outright wrongful dismissal until the election is made to end the contract. To
that extent we have offered an approach that differs significantly from the orthodox
principles by suggesting that an action lies in debt to recover the value of these wages.
We have also argued that the majority of the variation cases should be conceptualised
and resolved according to elective principles.  To this extent, it can be argued that
Alcan was wrongly decided. The appropriate cause of action in that case was not one
for unfair dismissal compensation but a common law  claim for damages, as in Rigby
v Ferodo Ltd. 85
We have accepted, however, that there are limited obligations within the contract that
end automatically upon an outright dismissal and we thus accept that automatic
termination should co-exist with an elective approach in so far as the former governs
the termination of a very limited number of obligations at common law.   These are
the obligations that are   associated with the “relationship” of employer and employee
                                                          
85   [1987] IRLR 516.
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such as   the duty to serve according to the contract86    and the duty to provide a safe
workplace.  Moreover we have not sought to contest the argument that the automatic
theory would also seem to have significant benefits in relation to time limits for
making statutory claims.
But this does not conclude the matter because we have also suggested that there is a
third principle governing the termination of contracts. This is used by the courts to
justify, for example,  the enforcement of restraint of trade clauses. We have seen that
these  obligations remain enforceable after the contract has ended and thus operate
outside either theory.  As we have seen, the enforcement of restraint of trade clauses
has never depended upon a continuing contract and so the courts have erred in
believing that the elective theory is necessary to justify their enforcement.  A more
convincing  explanation for the protection of proprietary or legitimate interests would
appear to be the doctrine of public policy rather than the continued existence of the
contract. This recognises and is entirely  consistent with the long established principle
that although restraint clauses may be created by agreement, their operation depends
on considerations beyond the contractual intention of the parties.   It is true that public
policy is normally understood as a means of  preventing the operation of unacceptably
wide restraints and that the suggestion here is the different one that it may be used to
continue existence of otherwise valid restraints after termination. Nevertheless, we
have argued that the case law justifies such a conclusion; indeed, this  is not perhaps
as controversial a might otherwise appear   when  it is recalled that the courts have
                                                          
86  It is the duty to serve as stipulated in the contract that ends upon an outright dismissal by the
employer. Any alteration in the content of that obligation, for example, an altered job description would
be subject to bilateral principles.
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already  used public policy to create obligations as implied terms, for example, in the
rules of monopolistic bodies.87
Once a role for public policy is understood and more openly acknowledged it may
lead to a number of developments within the context of the emerging “partnership”
model of industrial relations.    In Britain there has been an increasing emphasis upon
re-aligning the employment relationship in order to meet the challenges of globalised
competition. The precise nature of "partnership" remains somewhat elusive although,
at its broadest level, it would seem to require a cultural change that encourages greater
mutuality and respect for employees. This is offered in exchange for enhanced
motivation, “flexibility” and innovation on their part.88  A key element in gaining
from employees a greater commitment is a willingness to reward innovation.  Where
employers respond to this by negotiating terms that permit employees a greater share
of the benefit of their inventions than the law would otherwise permit,89 it would be
necessary to protect that interest by permitting the employee to enforce that term after
the employment has ceased. Neither the elective nor the automatic theories would
seem capable of explaining or justifying this.  Accordingly, where there are terms
intended by the parties to protect their respective proprietary interests a new theory of
termination is necessary.
But public policy is not merely confined to the continuation of terms concerned with
the proprietary interests of the parties. Apart from restraint of trade clauses, other
                                                          
87   E.g., Russell v Duke of Norfolk[1949] 1 All ER 109.
88  See B. Hough and A. Spowart-Taylor, “Realising Partnership in Employment Relations: Some Legal
Obstacles” forthcoming, King’s College Law Journal, Winter 2002/03.
 89  See Patents Act 1977, ss39-41 and Copyright, Design and Patents Act 1988, s.11 (2).
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terms subject to this principle might include, for example, a contractual responsibility
to ensure that any reference provided is fair. This obligation should also be
enforceable after the employee’s contract has been terminated.90
Conclusion
The law governing the termination of the contract of employment is in an inadequate
state. First the courts have assumed, wrongly as we have argued, that the proper
explanation of the common law rules lies in one or other of the two rival theories of
termination, the elective and the automatic theories.  It is evident, however, that even
if this were true, the courts have failed to make a consistent choice between them.
This fundamental level of indeterminacy of principle had led the judiciary to arrive at
decisions which are highly unsatisfactory. The threat posed by Alcan to bargain
security is not the least of these problematic decisions.
But this does not conclude the issue because, on the assumption that wages are only
earned by work having been done, each theory succeeds in denying employees a
measure of damages that would more accurately reflect their  losses following from an
employer’s wrongful dismissal.
                                                          
90  In TSB Bank v Harris [2000] IRLR 157 the EAT speculated, in an obiter dictum that the obligations
owed to a former employee may be different from those owed to a current employee enjoying the
protection of contractual terms such as the employer’s duty to maintain trust and confidence. This is the
implied term that may be breached by the provision of an unfair reference whilst the employee is still in
employment. The EAT’s reasoning that the obligation owed to the ex-employee are different simply
because a reference provided by a former employer might be less persuasive than a current one does not
seem to be convincing. Its alternative view that the contract has ended might also be vulnerable if our
argument below that some terms, including this one, may continue to be enforced post termination as a
question of public policy is accepted.
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The courts have achieved this injustice in effect, by absolving employers from their
breach of contract by holding that damages are assessed as if the contract had been
ended lawfully, when ex hypothesi, this was not the case.  This misconception has
destroyed for employees one of the principal benefits that was claimed for the elective
theory as one of its primary advantages over the automatic theory, namely the policy
of denying a reward to iniquitous parties to a contract.  This exposes a lack of balance
in the law because, in many leading cases in which courts have favoured the elective
view, it has been to extend employer’s controls over the post-termination activities of
the employee.  It would, however, be going too far to suggest that the adoption of the
elective theory has few advantages for employees because, as we have seen, there are
clearly instances where the survival of the contract until the date of an election has
been advantageous.  But, in relation to breaches by the employer, the misconception
of the doctrine of consideration does undermine an entitlement that the law should not
frustrate.
Similarly we have seen that the courts have strained orthodox contractual principles to
justify the enforcement of restraint clauses to control the activities of employees after
termination. The true basis for these decisions lies outside the ordinary law of contract
and in the arena of public policy and we have argued that the recognition of this could
provide a more satisfactory balance between employer and employee within the
emerging partnership agenda.
